





























The paper deals with relations between political system as described in the 1924 Turkish 
Constitution and the actual political system in Turkey in the period 1925–1946. Firstly, 
it refers to constitutional aspect of the Turkish revolution, then to practical dimension 
of the political system. In the end it shows the importance of incorporation of the six ar-
rows of Kemalism as article 2 of the Turkish Constitution.
During the Tanzimat reforms (1839–1876) some new institutions were intro-
duced into the traditional Ottoman political system which were signs of efforts directing 
towards rejuvenation of the Ottoman Empire. Among these were a principle of people's 
representation in the state agencies and broadening of legislative competences of vari-
ous councils functioning around the Sultan, connected with change in their social compo-
sition.1 The trials in this direction although inconsistent and not based upon determina-
tion to the total rejection of the existing political order, were instrumental in convening 
the first parliament upon the provisions of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution.2 The elections 
in 1876 and 1877 were the first in the Muslim world and produced the parliament which 
showed astounding liveliness and initiative in criticizing administrative malfunction, de-

















posed constitution with the main principle of unrestricted Sultan sovereignty. In such a 
case the parliament, endowed with insignificant powers, had not been able to compete 
with the sovereign power of the Sultan who put an end to the first constitutional period 
by suspending the Constitution two years after its coming into force.
The institutions of the 1876 Constitution had great significance, however, 
for later evolution constisting in democratizing the political system. When in July 1908 
a revolution made by the officer's conspiracy from Macedonia called the Young Turks 
had forced the Sultan to reinstate the Constitution, a conviction emerged that proper 
amendments to it would suffice for introduction of the parliamentary monarchy. The 
1911 amendments to the Constitution provided e.g. that the ministers were collectively 
responsible to the Parliament and that the representative body would prevail in any con-
flict with the Council of Ministers.4
The application of the constitutional order in the 1908–1918 period was diffi-
cult because of many obstacles which culminated in the coup d'etat made by Enver Pasha 
on 13 June 1913. The Constitution had been amended many times in order to strengthen 
the legal status of the Sultan to the effect that at the end of the World War I he could 
solve the Parliament with easiness as before.5 The Sultan had been reigning as a real sov-
ereign without the Parliament since 21 December 1918. Through cooperation with the 
political and military authorities of the Allies occupying the Ottoman Empire he wanted 
to restorate the absolute monarchy under British protectorate.6
The history of Turkish constitutionalism in the 1920–1924 period is very strictly 
connected with political events which led towards establishing of the Ankara center of 


















Asia Minor in May 1919 and arrival of Mustafa Kemal to Samsun. According to the Turk-
ish historiography, this last event constitutes the turning point in the modern history of 
Turkey, because it marks beginning of consolidation of the resistance movement against 
the military occupation of Ottoman territories by the Allies, consequence of which was 
the creation of the revolutionary center of power in Ankara. The declarations of nation-
alist congresses in Erzurum and Sivas demanded that the parliament in Istanbul be con-
vened. Nevertheless, the Representative Committee of the Society for the Defence of 
Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, established during the first congress of the nationalist 
movement, declared itself temporary government. It had to govern in the name of the 
Sultan according to the law in force till emergence of a government in Istanbul enjoying 
the Turkish nation's confidence. The pressures of the Mustafa Kemal's nationalists in-
clined the Sultan to concessions, e.g. elections to the last Ottoman parliament. The par-
liament in Istanbul convened on 12 January 1920 showed independence from the Allies 
and endorsed the National Pact, i.e. the document which declared break with discredited 
ideologies of the past in favor of nationalism. In response the Allies decided on full-scale 
military occupation of Istanbul and the Sultan dissolved the parliament. 
In view of the above mentioned facts, Mustafa Kemal acting as the Chairman 
of the Representative Committee of the Society for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia 
and Rumelia summoned a meeting of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (the TGNA). 
Nearly 100 deputies who could escape from Istanbul to Ankara together with over 200 
deputies elected in the election held following Mustafa Kemal's proclamation on 19 March 
1920, that an Assembly be convened in Ankara, met in Ankara and established the First 
Grand National Assembly on 23 April 1920. The declaration of the TGNA of 23 April 1920 
stated that the power was concentrated in the TGNA, and his Chairman was ex officio 
prime minister presiding over only functionally separated government. The real authority 
in the country was to be the national will represented by the Assembly, superior to which 
was no other state agency. This regulation meant a real rejection of the authority of the 
Sultan, although according to the words of the Declaration: “Sultan–Caliph, as soon as 
he is free from the coercion to which he submits, shall take (his) place within the consti-









goal of the TGNA, which was liberation of the Caliphate and the Sultanate on the base 
of the principle of sovereignty of the nation, the Parliament began to enact laws which 
real purpose was to establish the democratic constitutional order. The principles and in-
stitutions of the Constitutional Act of 20 January 1921: the sovereignty of the nation, 
an elected parliament and the principle of representation, prove that thesis.9 The said 
act had only temporary character.10 The Sultanate, regarded as an obstacle on the road 
to democracy, was abolished by the TGNA on 1 November 1922. The Caliphate, bound 
in the Ottoman Empire with the Sultanate, could not exist longer in Turkey as in institu-
tion of spiritual guidance over the Muslims scattered all over the world. From this rea-
son it was liquidated in the beginning of March 1924, after proclamation of the Republic 
(29 October 1923). This last amendment to the Constitutional Act of 1921 formally sep-
arated state organs: the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Chairman 
of the National Assembly. From this time on the political system of Turkey seemed to 
be like the parliamentary democracy. The electoral law was also democratised in 1923 
when the franchise was extended to all males over eighteen years of age, and the tax–
paying requirement for first and second electors was lifted. 
The culmination of the institutional reform process was adoption of the Con-
stitution in 1924 which retained most of the basic principles of the 1921 Constitutional 
Act, notably the principle of national sovereignty.11 The TGNA was considered, as it was 
in the said act of 1921, “the sole representative of the nation, on whose behalf it ex-
ercises the rights of sovereignty” (Art. 4). Both legislative and executive powers were 
concentrated in the Assembly (Art. 5), but the Assembly was to exercise its executive 
authority through the President of the Republic elected by it and the Council of Min-















Council of Ministers and dismiss it, while the Council had no power to dissolve the As-
sembly to hold new elections.
The belief in legislative supremacy was so deeply entrenched and emotion-
ally held during the years of the First TGNA (1920–1923) that, in the course of the de-
bates on the Constitution, the Assembly rejected or modified many proposals favour-
ing a somewhat stronger executive.12 For example, the draft Constitution prepared by 
the Constitutional Committee gave the President of the Republic, apparently with the 
blessings of Mustafa Kemal himself, the power to dissolve the Assembly and to veto bills. 
Such a veto could be overridden by a majority of two thirds. In the end, the Assembly re-
jected the entire article on dissolution, and the veto power was restricted in such a way 
that the President's objection could be overridden by a simple majority. Consequently, 
the constitutional status of the President of the Republic was very weak.
Due to the provisions of the 1924 Constitution, the Parliament was to be 
elected by Turkish citizens. Among freedoms and rights it listed e.g. the right to vote in 
the election of Turkish deputies and the right to be elected deputy, reserved for men who 
reached 18 and 30 years respectively, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, free-
dom of press and freedom of public meetings and association. 
The analysis of the constitutional acts from the 1920–1924 period shows be-
yond doubt that the purpose of the political system reform in Turkey was establishment 
of the democratic constitutional order. The 1924 Constitution was undoubtedly demo-
cratic in spirit. It had many disadvantages however. The political system it introduced was 
not a parliamentary government where powers are, to some extent, separated from each 
other. The authors of the Constitution chose an “assembly government” model based on 
the unity or concentration of the legislative and executive powers. 
This simple model of democracy was distinct visible in many provisions of the 
1924 Constitution. Its creation of an all-powerful Assembly, its somewhat emotional and 
unnecessary distrust of the executive, its insufficient safeguards for the independence of 
the judiciary, and its failure to institute formal restraints on the legislative power, notably 
the lack of a judicial mechanism for reviewing the constitutionality of laws, could make 
the political system unstable in practice. The rights granted by the Constitution were rel-
ative because of the formula “within the limits stipulated by law” inserted in many pro-
visions concerning rights and freedoms. Hence, the Assembly was constitutionally free 
of restricting basic rights at will.13
Turning our attention now to the 1924 Constitution in practice, we notice that 




been established, the governing party of Mustafa Kemal the Republican People's Party 
(the RPP) was put to the democratic test.14 From the program and manifesto of the PRP 
emerges a picture of the party which was loyal to the then existing constitutional order. 
While the resistance movement was convinced that the political system be modified, a 
group of it around Mustafa Kemal and the Republican People's Party wanted to make 
the revolution much more deeper in scope, by extending it into the socio-cultural sphere. 
Using the Sheikh Said revolt that had broken out in the Eeastern provinces of Turkey in 
February 1925 as a pretext, the multi-party experiment was brought to an abrupt end. 
The Law for the Maintenance of Order, passed on 4 March 1925, gave the constitution-
ally weak government wide extraordinary powers. Martial law was declared, and the In-
dependence Tribunals were reactivated. The PRP was closed on 3 June 1925, by a de-
cision of the Council of Ministers which implicated it in the revolt although no concrete 
proof of such a connection had been produced. Thus the RPP ruled Turkey from 1925 to 
1945 without the presence of any opposition party, with one significant exception of the 
Free Party episode in 1930.
The theoretical supremacy of the Assembly was in practice transformed into 
the domination of the executive, since normally the executive is composed of party or 
fraction leaders, while the legislature includes a numerically larger, but politically much 
weaker, group of back-benchers. The parliamentary control over the government was 
therefore suspended. The parliament's members chosen by Atatürk would have to break 
party discipline, acting against their chiefs in executive organs. Atatürk's status in the 
state structure was not based upon constitutional norms because his competences as 
the President of the Republic were insignificant. His supremacy over the political system 
resulted not from the law but from the fact that the parliament had been dominated by 
the only one legal party. The office of party Chairman held by Atatürk from 1923 until his 
death in 1938 was the locus of virtually total power over all parts of the party organiza-














Thus we see that during the single-party regime there were two totally dif-
ferent systems of government in Turkey. We have already stated that the President was 
described in the 1924 Constitution as the executive organ endowed with insignificant 
competences. Thanks to the ‘Chief’ system he possessed in reality an extreme authority 
that was never mentioned in the Constitution.16 We are inclined to ask if there was any 
trial to reconcile these two different systems of government on the constitutional level. 
The question should be answered in the affirmative because the six arrows of Kemalism 
(republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, etatism and revolutionism) were in-
serted in 1937 into the Turkish Constitution. 
The six arrows were instrumental in petrifying dictatorship in Turkey, causing 
at the same time internal contradictions in the 1924 Constitution.17 Unlike Ziya Gökalp's 
theoretical ideas, the six arrows of Kemalism did not constitute system of coherent ideo-
logical principles. It was a kind of recapitulation of reforms made mainly in the 1925–1930 
period when the Law for the Maintenance of Order was in force. Being the recapitulation 
of reforms imposed from above by dictatorial measures this ideology could not express 
democratic ideas. The principles of Kemalism directly or indirectly legitimized one-party 
state, while the ideal confirmed by the RPP Program of 1935 and some achievements in 
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